


Food Security Update Report

Malawi

November 2005

Areas at Risk: October 2005 – March 2006

Based on the extrapolation of price trends recorded up to October 2005



MALAWI
Vulnerability
Assessment Committee

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Vulnerability
Assessment
Committee

In collaboration with

The SADC-FANR

Regional
Vulnerability
Assessment
Committee



SADC FANR
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Assessment Committee



Government of the
Republic of Malawi



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Summary

The MVAC assessment carried out at harvest time in May 2005 identified certain parts of the country as having significant populations that are at risk of acute vulnerability to hunger and food insecurity for the coming agricultural consumption year (March 2005 to April 2006). The risk of hunger is expressed as a *missing food entitlement* (MFE). An *entitlement* is what a household must have in terms of its food stocks, own production, assets or income that it can use to meet its members' minimum basic needs, including food. What are termed 'missing food entitlements' in this document are that which are missing from the entitlements a household has in order to achieve its members' recommended minimum daily food intake. For simplicity of calculations, the MVAC concentrates on a single dietary nutrient within food intake, energy.¹

Missing food entitlements can be converted into any commodity, or a basket of commodities. For the sake of making comparisons, the MVAC expresses its missing food entitlements in three ways:

- As a percentage of the minimum food energy requirements (2100 kcal).
- As an equivalent in a common food commodity that can be weighed and compared with elsewhere. Maize has been chosen *but this in no way implies that maize is the only commodity that should be provided in response to the missing entitlement*. The resultant 'maize equivalent' can be totalled up over the population identified as being at risk and presented as a single value.
- As a cash equivalent. Since food can be bought or sold (unless markets are constrained by some massive catastrophic event or by the deliberate interventions of an authority or belligerent party), missing food entitlements can also be expressed in cash form. This cash form can also be totalled up over the population identified as being at risk and presented as a single value.

In May, the MVAC presented a *forecast* of vulnerability and this was dependent on many factors, some of which were not known at the time. For the variables that were known, data from the most rigorous sources were used but for those that were not, scenarios had to be constructed based on important assumptions. As far as possible, these assumptions were derived from the evidence and likelihood of various outcomes occurring during the year.

This report therefore presents an update on all these variables, both those that were known and those for which assumptions were made. As such, it should be read in conjunction with the MVAC Monitoring Report for June 2005 to make good sense. The June report also contains many details and descriptions on methodology as well as details on each livelihood zone. This report contains a minimum of discussion and presents updated tables and maps for planners.

The June 2005 MVAC report presented two scenarios for analysis, based on two possible outcomes for the purchase price of the main staple. Scenario 1 assumed that prices on the open market in Malawi would remain roughly within the levels of the previous three years' year-on-year inflation. This means that prices would rise during the hunger period this consumption year (December 2005 to March 2006) by roughly 11%, when compared with the hunger period of the 2004-2005 consumption year. Scenario 2 was based on the assumption that much of the food being sold in the markets during the main purchasing period would be come from further a field than neighbouring areas of Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia but from within the region and would be landed in Blantyre at \$220 a tonne. For this scenario, the rise in price, compared with last year, would be around 70%.

As the year has now unfolded, information has become available that either challenges or confirms the data and assumptions made in May and June at harvest time. This forces the resulting analysis to be modified. The modifications are described in the next section, "Changes to the problem specification" but broadly speaking, the notable changes that have taken place since the analysis of May and June 2005 are:

- The Third Round Crop Estimates are available. In many areas these show a worse production in maize than the second round but the data on other food crops seems to point to a small increase. There is also an increase in the quantities of cash crops (but not necessarily in quality). Some areas that were previously considered 'normal' are now known to be quite badly affected, for example, parts of Mzimba District
- Average prices for cash crops were very bad this year; undermining the benefits of increased production
- The maize price on the open market has increased dramatically, especially during the month of October 2005, while the amounts being sold by ADMARC (at a far lower, subsidised rate) are too small to greatly affect households' access.

¹ This in no way implies that the MVAC does not recognise the importance of other nutrients. MVAC information contains much that can be fed

- There have been deliveries of food aid and cash-for-work projects have been targeted at areas with vulnerable populations.

Table I provides a summary of the resulting analysis, comparing it with Scenario 1 in the June 2005 MVAC report. Looking at the whole consumption year, with humanitarian interventions excluded, there has been an increase in the number of vulnerable areas and consequently in the population at risk (from 4.224 million people to 5.044 million people) and in the total missing food entitlements (269,400 MT maize equivalent to 336,500 MT).

However, the aim of this information is to inform the planning of interventions and to do this, we need to include all food and cash households have received through interventions that have already taken place. Interventions that are set up well in advance and are unlikely to change (such as large-scale existing public works programmes) must have their planned quantities included as well. When this is done, there is somewhat of a decrease in missing food entitlements and the populations at risk, to 278,568 MT of maize equivalent and 4,854 million people, respectively. This must not be interpreted as being a reduction in the overall yearly humanitarian need; rather, it shows the impact of food and cash interventions that have taken place so far.

The fact that vulnerability has increased from that forecast by the old scenario 1 is underlined by looking at missing food entitlements for the period October 2005 to March 2006, or the second half of the consumption year. These are shown in the last line of **Table I**. Clearly, when one looks at these two figures, both the population at risk and the missing food entitlements have increased substantially (an additional 629,400 people at risk and an extra 51,500 MT maize equivalent spread across all populations at risk) from the old Scenario 1.

Table I - Comparison of Populations at Risk and Missing Food Entitlements for the earlier May 2005 Scenario 1 and the present updated analysis

	Analysis: May 2005, Scenario 1			Analysis: November 2005		
	Pop At Risk	Missing Food Entitlement		Pop At Risk	Missing Food Entitlement	
		Maize eq. (MT)	Cash equivalent (MWK)		Maize eq. (MT)	Cash equivalent (MWK)
The Whole Year, excluding all interventions	4,224,400	269,400	6.04 billion	5,071,000	335,400	11.48 billion
The Whole Year, including food aid up until 30 September 2005 and all other existing interventions				4,916,000	280,400	9.68 billion
The period October 2005 to March 2006, inclusive of interventions	4,224,400	201,800		4,916,000	255,000	8.82 billion

Changes to the Problem Specification

The MVAC defines the nature and extent of the problem this year in terms of a ‘problem specification’. This is presented for a given food, income or expenditure source for a given area as a percentage, derived by dividing this years figure by the baseline.

Crop Production

For crop production, the starting point is to compare the latest crop estimates from the Ministry of Agriculture for this season with those of previous seasons². Hence, the problem specification actually represents a *change* in production from normal, not the absolute value. Only crops that are grown to a significant extent in a particular livelihood zone are included. The percentages obtained this way are used critically by the MVAC, as sometimes they do not actually represent the true production for the different wealth groups that are affected. This may come about because a large amount of production stems from a few commercial farms or from a project that only benefits a few farmers, for example, that do not really represent poor smallholder figures.

The results of this analysis are presented in **Table VI**.

² The baseline for crop problem specifications is a composite figure based on the five-year average of 1998 to 2002. This reason for this choice is that these five years incorporate good, bad and average years and represent a reasonable figure for ‘normal’ production.

Commodity Prices

The prices households receive for commodities that they sell are key in providing both direct income and income for the poor through redistributive mechanisms, such as ganyu provision and local kinship or community support devices.

The MVAC converts price changes into problem specifications by dividing this year's average price during the buying or selling period by the average price during the same period in the baseline year. This gives a figure in percentage terms that represents the *change* in prices; for example a commodity that sold for K100 in the baseline and which sells today at K200, has a problem specification of 200%. Given that Malawi has fairly high rates of inflation, 'normal' prices are not figures that are same as those in the baseline (i.e., 100%) but rather figures that have increased by approximately 35% (a problem specification of 135%). Consequently, commodities with price problem specifications of 100% are actually cheaper today than in the baseline, in real terms.

The consumption year 2005-2006 has been poor in terms of prices for agricultural commodities. Tobacco prices were particularly low this year, a reflection of the poor international market for the product and the poor quality crop that was brought to market (a consequence of the rains and lack of fertiliser in 2004). Based on figures from the Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) and others, tobacco prices are 85%-90% of the baseline prices, in Kwacha terms. To be the same in real terms they would need to be 135%. Hence this year's prices were well below normal.

From 2002 until last year, prices for cotton improved quite drastically from what they were before that. For most farmers losses in maize or other food crop production were offset by high returns on cotton. This took a turn for the worse this season and, compared with last year, price fell considerably. However, when compared with baseline, prices are almost the same and a problem specification of 100% has been used. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that for the cotton price to be the same in real terms, the cotton price problem specification would need to be 135%, making this year's price actually well below normal.

Other food commodity selling prices varied considerably, depending on the commodity and the market. With some notable exceptions, the overall contribution of these sales to household incomes is not as significant as tobacco or cotton.

Staple Purchase Prices

Since exchange options play an important role in people's access to food, the price at which food is retailed is an important variable in determining their missing entitlements. Given this year's poor harvest, many poor households started running out of own-produced food much earlier than is normally the case and therefore depended on the markets for food. Consequently, market demand for maize has been steadily increasing.

Informal cross-border trade plays an important role in reducing the country's food deficit, now estimated at about 390,000 MT in the consumption period 1st April 2005 to 31st March 2006. The crops used to derive this figure include maize, rice, sorghum, millet, wheat and cassava. According to the Cross-border Trade Monitoring System, these six crops registered total net imports of about 83,000 MT in maize equivalent terms from April to October 2005. On its own, this reduces the food shortfall to about 307,000 MT. This deficit represents a shortage of *supply*³ (it does not represent a shortage in household access).


This imbalance of supply and demand has resulted in high open market maize prices and the only remaining affordable source for poor households to purchase food is the ADMARC markets, where a fixed and highly subsidised price has been offered. However, due to low stocks, ADMARC has been rationing maize sales to 25kg per person day, on occasions when they do have stocks to sell. Most of the local markets are recording prices well above MK25.00/kg (some as high as K45/kg) compared to the ADMARC fixed price of MK17.00/kg.⁴

Although the majority of the markets with very high maize prices are in the southern region, there are some markets in the central region that are experiencing very high prices, which could trigger serious food insecurity situations in these areas. Examples of these are Mtakatika (MK40.00/kg) in Dedza District, Sharpevale (MK45.45/kg) and Ntonda

³ Some of which may be covered by increased imported food aid.

⁴ There are two possible routes to making maize (and other food) prices more affordable: lowering the price through consumer subsidies or raising incomes, which for the rural poor in Malawi are appallingly low. Subsidies can be applied by an agent such as ADMARC, through the private sector or by a humanitarian organisation (food aid can be thought of as imported food that has been subsidised to a price of zero). Incomes can be raised in the short term through cash grants or cash for work programmes. Both routes have their advantages and disadvantages. Subsidies are expensive and discourage investment in trade and farming, therefore increasing the unpredictability of supply, while cash grants may have inflationary effects (although this should eventually be countered by increases in supply through a stimulated economy). Subsidies can be made cheaper and more effective through careful *targeting*, which can be difficult (though not impossible) to implement properly.

Figure 1 – Maize Price Developments in the Northern Livelihood Zones



(MK45.00/kg) in Ntcheu District and Kasiya (MK45.00/kg) in Lilongwe District. These markets are all in the Rift Valley Escarpment and Kasungu-Lilongwe Plain livelihood zones.

Maize price trends for each livelihood zone are presented in **Figure 0**, **Figure 0**, and **Figure 0**.

Increases in maize prices negatively affect the food access—all other things being equal, as the prices increase, the number of vulnerable people and their vulnerability increases too.


Other Local Options Available to Households

For the poor, casual labour or *ganyu* plays a very important part as a source of income and of food. During more abundant times, receiving households prefer cash, as it helps them to pay their debts and to purchase non-food essentials, such as clothing or household assets. However, during food scarcity, recipients do better when paid in food, which is usually maize. The converse usually applies to the employers, who prefer to pay in cash during scarcity and food during more abundant times. As it is usually the employer’s market, it is they who normally determine the mode of payment, although hiring *ganyu* is also a way that better-off households can provide some social responsibility.

Hence, while people may actively seek more *ganyu* (a normal coping response) they may only find less than what they seek. For the most part, the problem specifications used for *ganyu*-for-food ranged from 50% to 100%, depending on local harvests or other key supplies (such as cheaper imported food).

With *ganyu*-for-cash there is the extra variable of wage rate, which may go down significantly when supply (more people seeking work) exceeds demand (limited amounts of work on offer). The MVAC chose a more generous range from 70-100% on the *availability* of *ganyu*, but pegged wage rates at a level that is lower than originally forecast in May 2005.

Figure 2 – Maize Price Developments in the Central Livelihood Zones



Since 2003, terms of trade between casual labour and food have been steadily improving, effectively making up for the 'lost ground' incurred when Kwacha-based food prices increased in 2001-2003. As a rule, ganyu wage rates seem to be one year behind step with inflation; this makes sense when one considers that employers use the proceeds from last year's sales to pay this year's wages. Had wage rates this year followed this rule, then the problem specifications would have been in the order of 123%; however, because many more households ran out of their own food far earlier this year than in previous years, many more households have been seeking more ganyu than previously. This has put downward pressure on the market and wages are now similar to what they were three years ago—a problem specification of 100%—which, in real terms, is far worse than 'normal'.

In addition to ganyu, many households engage in activities that generate incomes for their members. Chief among these are the collection, manufacture and sale activities, such as firewood, charcoal and home-products like the manufacture of thatched products and implements. These activities are all grouped as "self-employment".

The legality of practising some of these activities places a constraint on the extent to which they may be practised, as well as households' ability to access the raw materials. For example, as more people collect and sell firewood, the numbers of trees diminish, people have to collect from further away. The result is that it takes longer to produce the same quantity and this caps the rate of production. Also, with a fairly constant demand for these products, prices tend to fall when supply increases reducing net income per household.

The maximum access to income from self-employment is based on the experience in 2002. In most areas, the MVAC agreed that the situation this year would be similar 2002, both in price and availability terms.

The Food Security and Nutrition Surveillance project managed by Action Against hunger systematically collects data on these two important food and income sources. Presently, data collection has been going on for just over one year. This will become an important secondary data source in coming months and years as comparisons can be made from one year to another.

Fishing is important for the lakeshore areas. Although there is some fluctuation in the size of catches each year and there is evidence of a gradual decline in production, this does not present a 'hazard' in for this year. Fish price have also been reasonably stable.


Humanitarian Interventions

The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and the Department of Poverty and Disaster Management Affairs collect information from as many stakeholders as possible. This is then combined onto analysis spreadsheets that compare actual deliveries with needs.

For comparison purposes with the previous analysis in April-May, the MVAC did do a complete analysis that excludes all interventions, predictably the total missing food entitlements and the populations at risk are higher for this analysis than for the one where interventions are included.

Food aid in Malawi this year has largely been managed by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Government of Malawi (with support from DFID). The country has been divided between these two with the North, Centre and some of the South (Mangochi and Balaka districts) going to the Government while the rest of the South goes to WFP. In caseload terms, WFP handles roughly two-thirds of beneficiaries.

Figure 3 – Maize Price Developments in the Southern Livelihood Zones



Since this analysis aims to inform emergency food aid, the analysis includes only food aid transfers that have actually taken place, that is, all deliveries up to the 1st October 2005.

The food aid response is based on a fixed ration, which, if all commodities are included, provides about 1,600 kcal per person per day. The total amount of food going to a beneficiary group is adjusted by varying the total period over which the ration is delivered. The distribution period always covers the last part of the agricultural consumption year. Hence, as the year progresses, more and more beneficiaries are targeted, necessitating revisions to the registration lists. It also means that earlier on in the year, a very small percentage of beneficiaries are actually targeted, in most cases far fewer than the actual people at risk.

The MVAC faced a dilemma on how to reflect this small target percentage in its analysis. Strictly speaking, an analysis should have been done for each of the beneficiary households and for non-beneficiaries. However, when including the cash components this would have made for a complex profile which would have been doubtful in use for planning

future programming. The MVAC therefore decided to effectively ‘dilute’ the impact of the ration in proportion to the population targeted versus that at risk. This dilution was reflected in the problem specification applied to the food aid as a source of food.

Previous post-distribution studies also indicated that households do not usually consume all that they receive; food is often ‘lost’ to pay for transportation, to repay debts and in sharing with others. The amount varies according to circumstance but is in the order of 25-40%. The MVAC therefore included a further problem specification of 70% to reflect these ‘losses’.

Significant cash transfers take place in Malawi, mostly through the World Bank funded Malawi Social Action Fund and the European Union (EU) funded Public Works programme. These cash programmes are pre-determined, that is, they are not expected to change after the publication of this report. Hence all programmes reported on, both delivered and planned, are included in this analysis. The exceptions to this are the new SPRINT Programme (funded by the EU) and new direct unconditional cash transfers, such as those being undertaken by Oxfam and Concern Worldwide. The cash programmes have an even smaller coverage (in terms of households targeted) than the food aid, so the dilution is considerable. Nevertheless, cash transfers covered the equivalent of at least 19,800 MT (at recent food prices).

There is some confusion over the role ADMARC, the parastatal charged with purchasing and distributing ‘commercial’ government maize. Since ADMARC retail prices are well below those on the open market, (ADMARC prices are set by a Cabinet Committee), food passed through this parastatal has a significant humanitarian impact. However, because ADMARC does not carry out any formal targeting of its food⁵, it is difficult to say who the beneficiaries really are and what the impact is on food access. ADMARC does carry out *rationing*, i.e., food sales are limited to a fixed quantity per buyer.

Outcome

This update of the analysis done in May tends to confirm that the situation at national level has deteriorated both in terms of the population at risk and the missing food entitlements. This development illustrates the seriousness of the food security situation in the country this season, especially in the southern region.

The missing food entitlements, as a percentage of people’s energy needs, are shown for each EPA in each district in **Table II**. The table also shows the relationship between the administrative entities of EPAs and districts with the livelihood zones that were used in the analysis. There are three groups of data columns in this table: the first group contains the average missing entitlements that a single person from either the ‘poor’ or ‘middle’ wealth group will face in the whole agricultural consumption year, while the second group contains the average missing entitlements that a single person faces in the second half of the consumption year.

Table II - Individual Missing Food Entitlements (Percentage of Energy Needs) and Populations at Risk for Districts, EPAs and Livelihood Zones

Affected Area			MFEs (Percentage of 2100 kcal)				Population At Risk	
District	EPAs	Livelihood Zone	Whole Year		Oct '05 to Mar '06		'Poor'	'Middle'
			'Poor'	'Middle'	'Poor'	'Middle'		
Balaka	Mpilisi, Phalula, Utale, Rivirivi, Bazale	Middle Shire Valley	40-50%	15-20%	>75%	30-40%	117,758	73,321
	Ulongwe	Middle Shire Valley	45-55%	20-30%	>75%	40-55%	34,745	21,634
Blantyre	Chipande, Lirangwe	Middle Shire Valley	45-55%	20-30%	>75%	40-55%	68,093	42,398
	Chipande	Shire Highlands	25-40%		55-70%		14,133	
	Ntonda, Kunthembwe	Shire Highlands	40-50%	0-5%	>75%	1-10%	61,920	90,065
Chikwawa	Dolo, Mbewe, Mitole	Lower Shire Valley	45-60%	35-45%	>75%	65-75%	159,400	188,800
	Kalambo, Livunzu, Mikalango	Lower Shire Valley	40-50%	15-25%	65-75%	25-40%		
Chiradzulu	Mbulumbudzi, Mombezi, Thumbwe	Shire highlands	40-50%	0-5%	>75%	1-10%	66,440	96,640
	Thumbwe	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	45-60%	0-5%	>75%	1-10%	23,279	38,799
Chitipa	Lufita, Mwankumbwa, Kameme	Chitipa Maize & Millet	15-20%		25-40%		27,721	
	Chisenga	Chitipa Maize & Millet	20-30%		40-55%		5,929	
	Kavukuku	Chitipa Maize & Millet	10-15%		20-30%		9,322	

⁵ There is some targeting of ADMARC food inasmuch that only those households that can afford the (subsidised) price of the ration will purchase it. Many households cannot even afford this.

Affected Area			MFEs (Percentage of 2100 kcal)				Population At Risk	
District	EPAs	Livelihood Zone	Whole Year		Oct '05 to Mar '06		'Poor'	'Middle'
			'Poor'	'Middle'	'Poor'	'Middle'		
Dedza	Golomoti, Mtakataka	Rift Valley Escarpment	30-40%	25-40%	55-65%	55-65%	15,700	19,000
	Golomoti, Mtakataka	Southern Lakeshore	20-30%		45-60%		20,200	
	Linthipe	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	10-20%		25-40%		16,281	
	Chafumbwa	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	10-20%		20-35%		12,638	
	Mayani	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	15-30%		35-50%		16,979	
	Kanyama, Linthipe	Border Productive Highlands	10-20%	1-10%	25-35%	5-15%	37,150	45,406
Dowa	Bowe	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	15-30%		35-50%		14,738	
	Mndolera	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	10-20%		25-40%		19,429	
	Mponela, Mvera, Nachisaka	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	25-35%		45-60%		43,740	
Karonga	Lupembe	Central Karonga	10-15%		20-30%		3,500	
	Vinthukutu	Nkhata Bay Cassava	0-5%		1-5%		13,200	
Kasungu	Chamama, Nkhamenya	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	20-35%		40-55%		63,000	
	Chulu, Santhe	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	10-15%		20-30%		35,479	
	Chipala	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	10-20%		20-35%		28,452	
	Lisasadzi	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	15-30%		35-50%		16,394	
Lilongwe	Chilaza, Chileka, Ming'ongo	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	25-35%		45-60%		40,812	
	Demela, Chitekwele,	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	15-30%		35-50%		33,730	
	Mlomba, Mitundu, Mpenu, Chigonthe, Chitsime, Chiwamba	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	10-20%		20-35%		90,615	
	Mng'wangwa, Malingunde	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	10-15%		20-30%		31,765	
Machinga	Chikweo	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	45-60%	1-5%	>75%	5-10%	13,449	22,415
	Nampeya, Nanyumbu,	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	35-45%		70-80%		27,969	
	Nsanama	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	25-35%		45-60%		10,950	
	Ntubwi, Domasi	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	45-55%	15-20%	>75%	30-40%	13,965	23,275
	Mbonechera, Nyambi, Ntubwi,	Shire Highlands	40-50%	0-5%	>75%	1-10%	45,421	66,067
	Malosa/Domasi Upland	Shire Highlands	50-65%	15-25%	>75%	35-45%	9,359	13,614
	Ntubwi	Middle Shire	45-55%	20-30%	>75%	40-55%	9,920	6,177
Mangochi	Chilipa, Mbwadzulu, Mthiramanja, Namkumba, Nasenga	Phirilongwe Hills	10-20%		25-40%		55,283	
	Masuku, Ntiya	Shire Highlands	25-40%		30-40%		43,595	
	Katuli, Lungwena	Shire Highlands	15-30%		35-50%		28,623	
	Mbwadzulu, Namkumba, Nasenga	Southern Lakeshore	10-20%		35-45%		66,400	
	Lungwena, Maiwa, Mpilipili	Southern Lakeshore	15-20%		30-45%		81,710	
Mchinji	Chioshya, Mikundi	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	15-30%		35-50%		33,142	
	Mkanda	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	25-35%		45-60%		22,376	
	Msitu	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	10-20%		20-35%		18,860	
Mulanje	Kamwendo, Msikawanjala, Thuchila	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	45-55%	10-25%	>75%	30-40%	107,400	178,900
	Milonde, Mulanje Boma	Thyolo Mulanje Tea Estates	40-50%	30-40%	>75%	60-75%	59,800	52,400
Mwanza	Mwanza	Rift Valley Escarpment	15-25%	10-20%	30-45%	25-35%	14,100	8,800
	Thambani	Middle Shire Valley	40-50%	15-20%	>75%	30-40%	20,700	25,000
Mzimba	Emfeni, Luwerezi	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	15-30%		35-50%		17,201	
	Bulala, Eswazini, Njuyu, Mbawa, Vibangalala, Mjinge, Bwengu	Mzimba Self-Sufficient	10-15%		20-30%		138,689	
	Euthini, Mbalachanda	Western Rumpi & Mzimba	15-20%		25-40%		21,806	
Neno	Neno	Rift Valley Escarpment	15-25%	10-20%	30-45%	25-35%	20,473	24,673
	Lisungwi	Middle Shire Valley	40-50%	10-25%	>75%	30-40%	13,600	8,500

Affected Area			MFEs (Percentage of 2100 kcal)				Population At Risk	
District	EPAs	Livelihood Zone	Whole Year		Oct '05 to Mar '06		'Poor'	'Middle'
			'Poor'	'Middle'	'Poor'	'Middle'		
Nkhatakota	Linga, Nkhunga,	Northern Lakeshore	5-15%		15-20%		39,237	
	Zidyana	Northern Lakeshore	10-20%		25-35%		10,535	
	Mwansambo	Rift Valley Escarpment	30-40%	15-20%	35-45%	30-40%	20,353	24,528
	Zidyana	Rift Valley Escarpment	15-20%	10-20%	30-40%	20-35%	12,450	15,004
	Nkhunga	Nkhata Bay Cassava	0-5%		1-5%		8,200	
Nsanje	Makhanga, Mogoti, Muona	Lower Shire Valley	40-50%	15-25%	65-75%	25-40%	32,990	39,067
	Mpatsa	Lower Shire Valley	45-60%	35-45%	>75%	65-75%	8,777	
	Nyachilenda, Zunde	Lower Shire Valley	40-50%	10-20%	70-80%	25-35%	43,146	51,094
Ntcheu	Njolomole	Border Productive Highlands	10-20%	1-10%	25-35%	5-15%	19,718	24,100
	Bilira, Nsipe,	Rift Valley Escarpment	15-20%	10-20%	25-35%	25-35%	62,686	75,544
	Kandeu, Manjawira	Rift Valley Escarpment	15-20%	10-20%	30-40%	20-35%	42,292	50,968
	Sharpevale	Rift Valley Escarpment	30-40%	25-40%	55-65%	55-65%	27,741	33,432
Ntchisi	Chipuka, Kalira, Malomo	Kasungu Lilongwe Plain	10-20%		20-35%		38,803	
	Kalira	Rift Valley Escarpment	30-40%	15-20%	35-45%	30-40%	17,806	21,458
Phalombe	Kosongo, Mpinda, Naminjiwa	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	45-55%	10-25%	>75%	30-40%	35,353	58,921
	Tamani, Nkhulambe Waruma	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	35-45%		70-80%		50,693	
Rumphi	Bolero, Katowo, part of Muhuju	Western Rumphi & Mzimba	15-20%		25-40%		21,600	
Salima	Chinguluwe, Chipoka	Rift Valley Escarpment	30-40%	10-25%	35-45%	30-40%	30,059	36,225
	Thembwe	Rift Valley Escarpment	15-25%	10-20%	30-45%	25-35%	9,422	11,355
	Kamuona (Khombedza)	Rift Valley Escarpment	15-20%	10-20%	30-40%	20-35%	24,391	29,394
	Chipoka	Southern Lakeshore	25-35%		55-65%		18,390	
	Kamuona (Khombedza), Thembwe	Southern Lakeshore	15-20%		30-45%		43,349	
Thyolo	Dwale, Khonjeni, Thyolo Central	Thyolo Mulanje Tea Estates	30-40%	15-25%	60-75%	35-45%	102,055	89,299
	Masambanjati, Thekerani	Thyolo Mulanje Tea Estates	25-40%	15-25%	60-70%	35-45%	106,099	92,836
	Matapwata	Shire highlands	25-40%		55-70%		6,300	
Zomba	Chingale	Middle Shire	30-40%	5-15%	60-70%	15-30%	25,000	15,600
	Dzaone, Chingale,	Shire Highlands	40-50%	0-5%	>75%	1-10%	63,519	92,392
	Thondwe	Shire Highlands	50-65%	15-25%	>75%	35-45%	37,938	55,183
	Mpokwe, Likangala, Msondole	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	25-35%		45-60%		61,429	
	Ngwerero	Lake Chilwa & Phalombe Plain	35-45%		70-80%		4,590	

The third group of columns provides information on the approximate numbers of people in each of the affected wealth groups that are at risk of having missing food entitlements.

Of the 4.91 million people at risk, 2.85 million are children under 18 years of age and 880 000 are children under five⁶.

Figure 0 shows the breakdown of the missing food entitlements per capita for each three-month season of the consumption year. It will be noted that in some areas there are still high (>10%) missing food entitlements during the period July to September. People can survive on substantially less than 2100 kcal/person/day, if only for a short period. We would also expect that some of these households would have experienced unacceptable levels of deprivation, due to their adopting coping strategies that are destructive to their livelihoods, are irreversible or are destructive to their local environment. This analysis is pegged at a level that allows for some preservation of livelihoods, which in many cases starts from a very low point.

⁶ According to the MDHS (Table 2.1), household population by age, sex and residence, on average 53% of household members are aged 0-18. (In the last 15-19 years age group the number was divided by 5 and multiplied by 3 to get the number for 15-17) In an average household of 5.5 members there will be therefore be an average of 2.9 children under 18 years of age. The number of children under five, according to the same table, is 17.9% or, for an average household size of 5.5 members there will be an average of 0.98 children under five.

Figure 4 - Seasonal development of Missing Food Entitlements Per Capita (for the poorest households) by three-month season

